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miércoles, 15 de mayo de 2013

Economía y psicología de diván: Sobre la filosofía de la ciencia económica


http://www.globalresearch.ca/economics-and-armchair-psychology/5335230


Economics and Armchair Psychology


keynes
Image: John Maynard Keynes
“Economics is haunted by more fallacies than any other study known to man.”― Henry Hazlitt
Over millennia, numerous enterprises have sought the status of science. Few have succeeded because they have failed to discover anything that stood up to scrutiny as knowledge. No body of beliefs, no matter how widely accepted or how extensive in scope, can ever be scientific.
In the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, the epicycle is a geometric model of the solar system and planetary motion. It was first proposed by Apollonius of Perga at the end of the 3rd century BCE and its development continued until Kepler came up with a better model in the 17th century, and the geocentric model of the solar system was replaced by Copernican heliocentrism. In spite of some very good approximations to the problems of planetary motion, the system of epicycles could never get anything right.
Phrenology was originated by Franz Joseph Gall [right] in the late 1700s. After examining the heads of a number of young pickpockets, Gall found that many of them had bumps on their skulls just above their ears and suggested that the bumps, indentations, and shape of the skull could be linked to different aspects of a person’s personality, character, and abilities. Gall measured the skulls of people in prisons, hospitals, and asylums and developed a system of 27 different “faculties” that he believedcould be directly diagnosed by assessing specific parts of the head, and he chose to ignore any contradictory evidence. After Gall’s death in 1828, several of his followers continued to develop phrenology. Despite some brief popularity, it was eventually viewed as a pseudoscience much like astrology, numerology, and palmistry. All of these, too, could never get anything right.
Sigmund Freud was an Austrian neurologist who is known as the father of psychoanalysis which is a clinical method for treating psychopathology by having a patient talk to a psychoanalyst. Results on the mental health of patients were scanty at best. Some contend that Freud set back the study of psychology and psychiatry “by something like fifty years or more”, and that “Freud’s method is not capable of yielding objective data about mental processes”. Others consider psychoanalysis to be perhaps the most complex and successful pseudoscience in history. Karl Popper, who argued that all proper scientific theories must be potentially falsifiable, claimed that no experiment could ever disprove Freud’s psychoanalytic theories and thus were totally unscientific. Now Freud’s work has little relevance in psychiatry. It could never cure anyone. But it was not Freud who created a  pseudoscience, it was the people who uncritically adopted his views.
Today the great fraudulent science is economics, but I don’t intend to beat that carcass. It has been shown not to be a science by numerous astute people. Even some renowned economists have been convinced of it. Paul Samuelson has said, “Economics has never been a science—and it is even less now than a few years ago.” Even Nassau William Seniorknew it: “The confounding Political Economy with the Sciences and Arts to which it is subservient, has been one of the principal obstacles to its improvement.”
Yet many working economists continue to claim that it is or at least that it is more of a science than its siblings in the social enterprises of study. Perhaps these people feel that their work lacks dignity if it is not scientific, being unable to say exactly what it is if it is not science. So let’s look at some things that economists regularly do to see if what they are doing can be defined.
Jared Bernstein [right], with a Ph.D. in Social Welfare from Columbia University, is not technically an economist but he has held many positions that an economist would usually hold. He was chief economist and economic adviser to Vice President Joe Biden and a member of President Obama’s economic team. Prior to joining the Obama administration, he was a senior economist and the director of the Living Standards Program at the Economic Policy Institute. Between 1995 and 1996, he held the post of deputy chief economist at the U.S. Department of Labor. His pieces are frequently posted on Economist’s View where I found a piece containing the following section:
the deeper, and more interesting, reason one worries about too-low inflation right now comes out of the work of Ackerlof et al back in the mid-1990s. It has to do with sticky wages, something Keynes recognized as contributing to intractably high UK unemployment back in the early 1920s. Back in the mid-90s, we also faced a period when price growth was slowing, and inflation hawks called for the Fed to set zero as their inflation target. Alan Greenspanapparently took it seriously, and internally debated the idea.
That inspired Ackerlof et al to think about what might happen in a zero inflation economy, and what they found was that it would engender significant costs in terms of unemployment and growth.
The reason that zero inflation creates such large costs to the economy is that firms are reluctant to cut wages. In both good times and bad, some firms and industries do better than others. Wages need to adjust to accommodate these differences in economic fortunes. In times of moderate inflation and productivity growth, relative wages can easily adjust. The unlucky firms can raise the [nominal] wages they pay by less than the average, while the lucky firms can give above-average increases. However, if productivity growth is low (as it has been since the early 1970s in the United States) and there is no inflation, firms that need to cut their relative wages can do so only by cutting the money [i.e., nominal] wages of their employees. Because they do not want to do this, they keep relative wages too high and employment too low.
As long as there’s a little inflation in the system, “less fortunate” firms can give nominal wage increases below the rate of inflation, allowing them to adjust to harder times. With very low inflation, they don’t have the room to pull that off.
When I read this, I recognized that the fuzzy writing, which is always a symptom of bad thinking, lead to entirely the wrong conclusions. First we see that “firms are reluctant to cut wages.” Then we see that firms cut wages by giving “nominal wage increases below the rate of inflation” which, apparently, firms are not at all “reluctant” to do. The conclusion that aches to be drawn is that inflation allows firms to covertly reduce the wages of their employees, and it does that regardless of the firms’ financial conditions, since nothing prohibits any firm from giving raises below the rate of inflation. Bernstein wants the rate of inflation to be higher so employers can engage in this sneaky way of reducing the wages of their employees. Inflation is good for employers but bad for employees.
Bernstein is involved in equation adjusting, a prevalent practice among economists. An equation exists; economists call it a model. The equation, they believe, describes reality albeit in a simplistic way. When economic data is plugged into the equation, if both sides are unequal, one side, or sometimes both sides, must be adjusted to make both sides equal. I don’t know what specific equation Bernstein has in mind, but I know that one side describes, in mathematical terms, the economic conditions firms face, and the other side describes the costs of production. So when the side that describes the economic conditions the firms face declines, something on the other side must be reduced.
For Bernstein, it’s wages. But what has the equation to do with reality? Economists believe that their equations describe reality accurately, but no model ever comes accompanied by a proof that it does. As Keynes pointed out, “Too large a proportion of recent ‘mathematical’ economics are mere concoctions, as imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest on, which allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and unhelpful symbols.” As others have pointed out, the map is not the territory.
When the model that Bernstein has in mind is combined with what economists call the Paradox of Thrift (the claim that saving benefits consumers but damages the economy and spending, which benefits the economy, damages consumers), it follows that Capitalism can never be made to function in a way that benefits all people.
Economic models are based on mere beliefs, many of which can never be known to be true. Consider the following claims for instance:
“Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that.” Adam Smith
“Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command.” Adam Smith
“That every person is desirous to obtain, with as little sacrifice as possible, as much as possible of the articles of wealth.” Nassau William Senior
“Everyone wants to live at the expense of the state.” Frederic Bastiat
“People spend more when they feel wealthier, even if they’re not.: Economists call this the “wealth effect,”
“the consumption of the rich is no more than a scaled-up version of the consumption of the poor”
And then there’s this from Dani Rodrik: “Mainstream economists are often seen as ideologues of the market economy. I would concede that most of my economist colleagues tend to view markets as inherently desirable and government intervention as inherently unwelcome. But in reality what we teach our students in the classroom – the advanced students if not the undergraduates –and what we talk about in the seminar room are typically much more about the myriad ways in which markets fail.”
How could anyone know any of these things? Did Adam Smith spend a lot of time observing the behavior of dogs? And even if he did, what would that have taught him about trade? In what sense do public school teachers or nurses continually exert themselves to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital s/he can command? How many readers of this piece want to live at the expense of the state? And how many economics teachers have had their teaching observed by Prof. Rodrik? No evidence exists for the truth of any of these examples.
So why do economists make claims like these? Is it because these claims describe how they themselves would behave if given the opportunity? Was Bastiat spectacularly lazy? Was Smith really a greedy man? If those who make such claims wouldn’t have acted in the ways they described, wouldn’t they then know that the claims were false?
These all are unprovable claims about human (or canine) nature. Economics as we know it is nothing but claims about how human beings will act in given circumstances. As such, it is nothing but armchair psychology, and the psychology is based on the psychological attributes of the economists making the claims. Greedy people believe that all people are. Dishonest people believe that all people are. Corrupt people believe that all people are. Evil people believe that all people are. But, you know, they’re wrong! Paul Bloom, a professor of psychology at Yale, says.
When it comes to accepting or changing the status quo . . . [people] tended to “defer to experts or the community.” Economists assume that “everything is subject to market pricing unless proven otherwise. … The problem is not that economists are unreasonable people, it’s that they’re evil people. … They work in a different moral universe.”
Martin Feldstein tells us how its all supposed to work:
“When the Fed buys long-term government bonds and mortgage-backed securities, private investors are no longer able to buy those long-term assets. Investors who want long-term securities therefore have to buy equities [stocks]. That drives up the price of equities, leading to more consumer spending [wealth effect].”
But it doesn’t work, does it?
Economists have been carrying coal to Newcastle since Adam Smith provided English merchants with a rationalization of what they had always wanted to do—treat their fellow human beings as beasts of burden. Economists continue to perform the same function.
“Capitalism is the astounding belief that the most wickedest of men will do the most wickedest of things for the greatest good of everyone.”—John Maynard Keynes
Economics is not about economy; it is a way or organizing society. Our economists have resuscitated an old social order. We live in a neofeudal world where the elite rentier group lives in manor mansions and everyone else is a serf.
John Kozy is a retired professor of philosophy and logic who writes on social, political, and economic issues. After serving in the U.S. Army during the Korean War, he spent 20 years as a university professor and another 20 years working as a writer. He has published a textbook in formal logic commercially, in academic journals and a small number of commercial magazines, and has written a number of guest editorials for newspapers.  His on-line pieces can be found onhttp://www.jkozy.com/ and he can be emailed from that site’s homepage.



sábado, 11 de mayo de 2013

Dani Rodrik: Para qué sirven los economistas. Teoría económica, política económica y el papel del economista, sus investigaciones y el uso de sus resultados

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-provisional-nature-of-economic-research-by-dani-rodrik


una traducción, más abajo



What Use Are Economists?

CAMBRIDGE – When the stakes are high, it is no surprise that battling political opponents use whatever support they can garner from economists and other researchers. That is what happened when conservative American politicians and European Union officials latched on to the work of two Harvard professors – Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff – to justify their support of fiscal austerity.
This illustration is by Paul Lachine and comes from <a href="http://www.newsart.com">NewsArt.com</a>, and is the property of the NewsArt organization and of its artist. Reproducing this image is a violation of copyright law.
Illustration by Paul Lachine
Reinhart and Rogoff published a paper that appeared to show that public-debt levels above 90% of GDP significantly impede economic growth. Three economists from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst then did what academics are routinely supposed to do – replicate their colleagues’ work and subject it to criticism.
Along with a relatively minor spreadsheet error, they identified some methodological choices in the original Reinhart/Rogoff work that threw the robustness of their results into question. Most important, even though debt levels and growth remained negatively correlated, the evidence for a 90% threshold was revealed to be quite weak. And, as many have argued, the correlation itself could be the result of low growth leading to high indebtedness, rather than the other way around.
Reinhart and Rogoff have strongly contested accusations by many commentators that they were willing, if not willful, participants in a game of political deception. They have defended their empirical methods and insist that they are not the deficit hawks that their critics portray them to be.
The resulting firestorm has clouded a salutary process of scrutiny and refinement of economic research. Reinhart and Rogoff quickly acknowledged the Excel mistake they had made. The dueling analyses clarified the nature of the data, their limitations, and the difference that alternative methods of processing them made to the results. Ultimately, Reinhart and Rogoff were not that far apart from their critics on either what the evidence showed or what the policy implications were.
So the silver lining in this fracas is that it showed that economics can progress by the rules of science. No matter how far apart their political views may have been, the two sides shared a common language about what constitutes evidence and – for the most part – a common approach to resolving differences.
The problem lies elsewhere, in the way that economists and their research are used in public debate. The Reinhart/Rogoff affair was not just an academic quibble. Because the 90% threshold had become political fodder, its subsequent demolition also gained broader political meaning. Despite their protests, Reinhart and Rogoff were accused of providing scholarly cover for a set of policies for which there was, in fact, limited supporting evidence. One clear lesson is that we need better rules of engagement between economic researchers and policymakers.
A solution that will not work is for economists to second-guess how their ideas will be used or misused in public debate and to shade their public statements accordingly. For example, Reinhart and Rogoff might have downplayed their results – such as they were – in order to prevent them from being misused by deficit hawks. But few economists are sufficiently well attuned to have a clear idea of how the politics will play out.
Moreover, when economists adjust their message to fit their audience, the result is the opposite of what is intended: they rapidly lose credibility.
Consider what happens in international trade, where such shading of research is established practice. For fear of empowering the “protectionist barbarians,” trade economists are prone to exaggerate the benefits of trade and downplay its distributional and other costs. In practice, this often leads to their arguments being captured by interest groups on the other side – global corporations that seek to manipulate trade rules to their own advantage. As a result, economists are rarely viewed as honest brokers in the public debate about globalization.
But economists should match honesty about what their research says with honesty about the inherently provisional nature of what passes as evidence in their profession. Economics, unlike the natural sciences, rarely yields cut-and-dried results. For one thing, all economic reasoning is contextual, with as many conclusions as potential real-world circumstances. All economic propositions are “if-then” statements. Accordingly, figuring out which remedy works best in a particular setting is a craft rather than a science.
Second, empirical evidence is rarely reliable enough to settle decisively a controversy characterized by deeply divided opinion. This is particularly true in macroeconomics, of course, where data are few and open to diverse interpretations.
But even in microeconomics, where it is sometimes possible to generate precise empirical estimates using randomization techniques, the results must be extrapolated in order to be applied in other settings. New economic evidence serves at best to nudge the views – a little here, a little there – of those inclined to be open-minded.
In the memorable words of the World Bank’s chief economist, Kaushik Basu, “One thing that experts know, and that non-experts do not, is that they know less than non-experts think they do.” The implications go beyond not over-selling any particular research result. Journalists, politicians, and the general public have a tendency to attribute greater authority and precision to what economists say than economists should really feel comfortable with. Unfortunately, economists are rarely humble, especially in public.
There is one other thing that the public should know about economists: It is cleverness, not wisdom, that advances academic economists’ careers. Professors at the top universities distinguish themselves today not by being right about the real world, but by devising imaginative theoretical twists or developing novel evidence. If these skills also render them perceptive observers of real societies and provide them with sound judgment, it is hardly by design.
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¿De qué sirven los economistas?

 CAMBRIDGE - Cuando hay mucho en juego, no es de extrañar que quienes luchan contra los opositores políticos utilicen todo el apoyo que pueden obtener,  gracias a economistas y otros investigadores. Eso es lo que sucedió cuando los políticos estadounidenses conservadores y funcionarios de la Unión Europea se aferraron a la labor de dos profesores de Harvard - Carmen Reinhart y Kenneth Rogoff - para justificar su apoyo a la austeridad fiscal.
Este ejemplo está por Paul Lachine y viene de <a href="http://www.newsart.com"> NewsArt.com </ a>, y es propiedad de la organización NewsArt y de su artista.  La reproducción de esta imagen es una violación de la ley de derechos de autor.
Ejemplo de Paul Lachine
 Reinhart y Rogoff publicaron un documento que parecía demostrar que los niveles de deuda pública por encima del 90% del PIB dificultan significativamente el crecimiento económico. Tres economistas de la Universidad de Massachusetts en Amherst y luego hicieron lo que los académicos se supone habitualmente que hacer - repetir el trabajo de sus colegas y de someterla a la crítica.
 Junto con una hoja de cálculo de error relativamente menor, se identificaron algunas opciones metodológicas en el trabajo Reinhart / Rogoff original que lanzó la solidez de sus resultados en la pregunta. Lo más importante, a pesar de que los niveles de deuda y el crecimiento se mantuvo una correlación negativa, la evidencia de un umbral del 90% fue revelado a ser muy débil. Y, como muchos han sostenido, la propia correlación podría ser el resultado de un bajo crecimiento que conduce a altos niveles de endeudamiento, en lugar de al revés.
 Reinhart y Rogoff han impugnado enérgicamente las acusaciones por muchos comentaristas que estaban dispuestos, si no es intencional, los participantes en un juego de engaño político. Ellos han defendido sus métodos empíricos e insisten en que no son los halcones del déficit que sus críticos retratan que sean.
 La tormenta de fuego resultante se nubló un proceso saludable de escrutinio y el perfeccionamiento de la investigación económica. Reinhart y Rogoff reconocieron rápidamente el error Excel que habían hecho. Los análisis de duelo aclararon la naturaleza de los datos, sus limitaciones, y la diferencia que los métodos alternativos de procesamiento de ellos hacen a los resultados. En última instancia, Reinhart y Rogoff no estaban tan lejos de sus críticos a ambos lo que las pruebas demostraban o cuáles eran las implicaciones políticas.
 Así que el lado bueno de esta pelea es que se demostró que la economía puede avanzar por las reglas de la ciencia. No importa lo lejos que pueden haber sido sus opiniones políticas, las dos partes comparten un lenguaje común sobre lo que constituye evidencia y - en su mayoría - un enfoque común para resolver las diferencias.
 El problema es otro, en la forma en que los economistas y sus investigaciones se utilizan en el debate público. El asunto Reinhart / Rogoff no era más que una sutileza académica. Debido a que el umbral del 90% se había convertido en carne de política, su posterior demolición también ganó más amplio sentido político. A pesar de sus protestas, Reinhart y Rogoff fueron acusados ​​de proporcionar cobertura académica de un conjunto de políticas para las que no fue, de hecho, la evidencia de apoyo limitado. Una lección clara es que necesitamos mejores reglas de enfrentamiento entre los investigadores económicos y políticos.
 Una solución que no funciona es que los economistas de adivinar cómo se usarán sus ideas o mal en el debate público y para dar sombra a sus declaraciones públicas en consecuencia. Por ejemplo, Reinhart y Rogoff podrían haber minimizado sus resultados - tal como estaban - con el fin de evitar que sean mal utilizados por los halcones del déficit. Pero pocos economistas están suficientemente adaptados para tener una idea clara de cómo la política se jugará.
 Por otra parte, cuando los economistas ajustan su mensaje para adaptarse a su público, el resultado es el contrario de lo que se pretende: que rápidamente pierden credibilidad.
 Tenga en cuenta lo que ocurre en el comercio internacional, cuando dicha sombra de la investigación es una práctica establecida. Por miedo a potenciar los "bárbaros proteccionistas", los economistas del comercio son propensos a exagerar los beneficios del comercio y minimizar sus costos de distribución y otros. En la práctica, esto conduce a menudo a sus argumentos de ser capturado por los grupos de interés en el otro lado - las corporaciones globales que tratan de manipular las reglas del comercio para su propio beneficio. Como resultado, los economistas rara vez vistos como intermediarios honestos en el debate público sobre la globalización.
 embargo, los economistas deben coincidir con honestidad sobre lo que su investigación dice con honestidad acerca de la naturaleza intrínsecamente provisional de lo que pasa como prueba en su profesión. Economía, a diferencia de las ciencias naturales, rara vez produce resultados cortar y secos. Por un lado, todo el razonamiento económico es contextual, con tantas conclusiones como las circunstancias de la vida real potencial. Todas las proposiciones económicas son "si-entonces". En consecuencia, averiguar qué remedio funciona mejor en un entorno particular, es un arte más que una ciencia.
 En segundo lugar, la evidencia empírica rara vez es lo suficientemente confiable para resolver una controversia con decisión caracterizada por la opinión profundamente dividida. Esto es particularmente cierto en la macroeconomía, por supuesto, en que los datos son pocos y abierta a diversas interpretaciones.
 Pero incluso en microeconomía, donde a veces es posible generar estimaciones empíricas precisas utilizando técnicas de aleatorización, los resultados deben ser extrapolados a fin de ser aplicada en otros contextos. Nueva evidencia económica sirve en el mejor para empujar a los puntos de vista - un poco aquí, un poco allá - de aquellos que tienden a tener la mente abierta.
 En las memorables palabras del economista del Banco Mundial, el jefe, Kaushik Basu, "Una de las cosas que los expertos saben, y que los no expertos no, es que saben menos que los no expertos piensan que lo hacen." Las implicaciones van más allá de no más de -venta de cualquier resultado de investigación particular. Los periodistas, los políticos y el público en general tienen una tendencia a atribuir una mayor autoridad y precisión a lo que los economistas dicen que los economistas deberían sentir realmente cómodo. Por desgracia, los economistas rara vez son humildes, especialmente en público.
 Hay otra cosa que el público debe saber acerca de los economistas: es inteligencia, no la sabiduría, que las carreras avances economistas académicos. Los profesores de las mejores universidades de hoy en día no se distinguen por tener la razón sobre el mundo real, pero ideando giros teóricos imaginativos o el desarrollo de nuevas pruebas. Si estas habilidades también les hacen observadores perceptivos de las sociedades reales y darles buen juicio, no es de por diseño.
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martes, 7 de mayo de 2013

En Noruega la basura a pasado de ser un mal a un bien, o recurso generador de energía, gracias a la eficiencia de sus tecnologías y la actitud ecológica de su población


http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2013/05/130506_escasez_basura_oslo_ig.shtml?ocid=socialflow_facebook_mundo


Oslo necesita basura

Planta incineradora de Waste to Energy de Brobekk, en Oslo
La de Brobekk fue la primera planta incineradora de Noruega, dentro del programa de Waste to Energy.
Se podría decir que los noruegos son víctimas de su propio éxito: son tan eficientes en su gestión de residuos que están sufriendo una escasez de basura.
Esta es una situación relativamente nueva en Noruega. Se desarrolló sólo en los últimos 3 o cuatro años, a raiz de la proliferación en los países escandinavos de plantas que convierten la basura en electricidad y calefacción.
"Ahora hay demasiadas plantas comparado con la cantidad de desechos que se producen", le dijo a BBC Mundo Jannicke Gerner Bjerkas, gestora de comunicaciones de la agencia Waste-to-Energy de la ciudad de Oslo.
Pero en la vecina Suecia, pionera en esta política medioambiental, hace más tiempo que lidian con este problema. De hecho, Suecia importa basura de sus paises vecinos, incluida la propia Noruega.
Esta escasez es el resultado de décadas de campañas gubernamentales para promover entre los ciudadanos una gestión responsable de los desechos, que incluye la reducción, reutilización y reciclaje de la basura.
Ahora, la sobrecapacidad de las plantas incineradoras ha llevado a la ciudad de Oslo a buscar desechos ajenos.
El departamento de marketing de la agencia Waste-to-energy se afana por encontrar basura en el exterior, a través de licitaciones oficiales a las que se postulan las compañias que quieren deshacerse de la basura al menor costo posible.
Por ahora sólo importan basura de Inglaterra, pero están buscando otros mercados y, según Gerner Bjerkas, es probable que otras plantas noruegas pronto lo hagan también.

El negocio de la basura

Son las empresas que poseen la basura las que pagan por deshacerse de ella, tanto si el método es tirarla en un vertedero local como llevarla a quemar a Noruega.
En Reino Unido, curiosamente, una tasa impuesta a los ayuntamientos por el uso de vertederos -orientada a promocionar el reciclaje-, hace que pueda acabar resultando más barato enviar los desechos a Oslo.
"La basura pasa a considerarse un recurso. Es un recurso para generar energía"
Jannicke Gerner Bjerkas, Waste-to-Energy
De manera que la capital noruega "gana dinero" al tratar esa basura extranjera. Eso, a pesar de que los costes del procesamiento han caido mucho en los últimos años.
"Funciona esencialmente como una puja. Nosotros hacemos una oferta y ellos escogen la compañía que más les convenga", explicó Gerner Bjerkas.
Algunas de estas plantas son de propiedad privada, otras dependen directamente de agencias estatales.
"Y como hay demasiadas plantas procesadoras, los precios en el mercado han caído", dijo.
La ganacia para los escandinavos es doble: no sólo cobran por procesar los desechos sino que además generan electricidad con ellos.
"La basura pasa a considerarse un recurso. Es un recurso para generar energía", explicó Gerner Bjerkas.
Una vez clasificada, la basura se quema, alcanzando una temperatura de hasta 1000 C. Así se calienta el agua que eventualmente alimenta los radiadores de las ciudades.

Basura "de calidad"

Pero no todas las basuras son iguales: algunas son más "limpias" o de mayor calidad que otras.
Para los noruegos no se trata tanto de generar beneficios a partir de cualquier tipo de basura sino de proteger el Medio Ambiente.
"Estamos hablando de un negocio, sí, pero desde una perspectiva ecológica", puntualizó Gerner Bjerkas.
Y desde ese punto de vista, cuanto más trabajo de clasificación se hace antes de la quema, mejor.
"Preferimos aceptar basura que ha sido preclasificada antes de llegar a nosotros, por ejemplo en metales, plásticos, basura orgánica, papel, cartón y materiales peligrosos, y de la que se han retirado los materiales reciclables antes del transporte. Eso es mucho mejor para el Medio Ambiente", explicó Gerner Bjerkas.
Vertedero en Inglaterra
Los ayuntamientos británicos deben pagar un alto impuesto por el uso de vertederos, una política orientada a promover el reciclaje.
Esta estrategia de los países escandinavos marca enormes diferencias con la práctica tradicional de arrojar o enterrar la basura en vertederos, algo que genera mucho gas metano.
Además del precio y la "calidad", a la hora de aceptar basura de importación, un factor importante es el kilometraje hasta Oslo.
"Cuanto menor es la distancia menor es el impacto ambiental", dijo Gerner Bjerkas.
Por eso hasta ahora Noruega se ha centrado en buscar basura en el mercado europeo.
Los precios varían enormemente dependiendo del tipo de basura y del tipo de contrato con las plantas procesadoras.
Igual que en otros mercados, en general cuanto más largos son los contratos y mayor la cantidad de basura, menores son los precios.
La basura que Oslo importa actualmente de Inglaterra, por ejemplo, sólo se entrega en los meses del invierno, de octubre a abril, en los que se necesita más combustible para generar calefacción.
"En total, este año nos llegaron desde Inglaterra 50.000 toneladas de basura".
"Si se ajusta la fecha de entrega a los meses del invierno, entonces podemos aceptar un precio más bajo", explicó Gerner Bjerkas.
Poco a poco las plantas incineradoras de la región escandinava están poniendo los ojos en Europa.
Hasta ahora esencialmente ha sido en busca de basura "de calidad".
Y en un futuro no muy lejano, lo harán también para exportar su tecnologia y experiencia en la gestión de residuos.

miércoles, 1 de mayo de 2013

El costo de producción y precio de mercado del Galaxy S4


http://www.dineroenimagen.com/2013-05-01/19621


Lo que en verdad cuesta fabricar un Galaxy S4

Publicado por Redacción el Miércoles 01-05-2013

Lo que en verdad cuesta fabricar un Galaxy S4

Publicado por Redacción el Miércoles 01-05-2013

Luego del pomposo anuncio del Samsung Galaxy S4 y su salida a la venta en nuestro país el próximo 8 de mayo, la compañía espera que sea tan exitoso como su versión S3 y sea tan competitivo como sus contrapartes de Apple y otros dispositivos con Android.
Pero, ¿cuánto le cuesta a esta empresa fabricar este smartphone? En Estados Unidos, adquirir un Galaxy S4 cuesta ni más ni menos que 600 dólares. Echando un vistazo al interior del aparato, la parte más cara con la que está en su pantalla táctil, costando 31.50 dólares, lo que le confiere la resolución y manejo de la que se jactan.
Después, el procesador del S4 -el encargado de hacer que el teléfono funcione y sea inteligente- tiene un costo para la empresa de 25.50 dólares; las cámaras, una de 13 y otra de 2 megapixeles cuestan 18.25 dólares más otros elementos como la batería y otros dispositivos de memoria suman juntos 24.65 dólares, sumado a la superficie y otros no electrónicos que en suma dan 58.90 dólares.
Uniendo todas sus partes, y sin tomar en cuenta la mano de obra, el Galaxy S4 tiene un costo de 171.45 dólares contra los 600 a los que se oferta en el mercado estadounidense. Claro está, la empresa ha tenido una importante inversión en publicidad, que ya rebasa a las de Apple y Coca-Cola.

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